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The Tenth Amendment Iceberg
By NICHOLAS HELDT*
In modem constitutional law, limits on the commerce power are as
rare as the phoenix.' Nonetheless, 1976 saw the Phoenix rise in a dis-
pute over firefighters' wages. In National League of Cities v. Usery,2
the Court held that application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to fire
and police department employees violated states' rights under the tenth
amendment. Because firefighters and police performed functions tradi-
tionally within the bailiwick of local government, congressional regula-
tion of their wages and working conditions demeaned the sovereignty
of the states.
It does demean a sovereign to be treated as any ordinary citizen.
If the state must submit to federal regulation of the most basic activities
it exists to perform, and if the commerce power is all embracing, the
states remain sovereign only at the pleasure of the federal government.
Sovereignty on these terms is a myth.3
National League of Cities v. Usery constitutionalized some mini-
mum realm in which the state is sovereign. It is still the only Supreme
Court decision invalidating a federal regulation as a violation of the
tenth amendment. One commentator has concluded that it will remain
the only one.4 Professor Barber of Chicago has written that repeated
efforts to enforce the tenth amendment, as in League of Cities, would
* B.A., 1975, University of Santa Clara. Member, California Bar.
1. "Until 1976, the conventional wisdom was that, since 1937, there have been no
judicially enforceable limits on congressional power which derive from considerations of
federalism. The sole protections for the states, it was said, were political." L. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 300 (1978). The relationship of interpretation of the tenth
amendment to the scope of the commerce clause, the relationship of state and federal power,
and the Court's role of arbiter were recently explored in Barber, National League of Cities v.
Usery: New Meaningfor the Tenth Amendment, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 161.
2. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
3. One commentator discussing the conception of the all-embracing commerce clause
concluded that "[tlhe states have no guarantee of sovereignty under this conception of na-
tional power." Barber, National League of Cities v. Usery. New Meaningfor the Tenth
4mendmentZ 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 161, 176.
4. See Barber, National League of Cities v. tisery. New Meaningfor the Tenth Amend-
ment?, 1976 Sup. CT. REv. 161.
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inevitably lead the Court to a confrontation with Congress reminiscent
of the New Deal. It was that confrontation that first prompted the
Court to read the commerce clause with its modern expansive reach.
To Professor Barber, League of Cities was merely a vestigial expression
of states' rights philosophy.:
During the forty years since the New Deal, social control has inex-
orably consolidated in the expanding federal bureaucracy on the
strength of the commerce power and the spending power. In the last
twenty years, the Supreme Court has assumed an active role in super-
vising state misconduct under the Bill of Rights and Civil War amend-
ments. The states have seemed destined to become mere
administrators of federal programs and regulations, a convenience of
the federal government much as municipal corporations are an admin-
istrative convenience of the states. 6
Although League of Cities is uniqe in its tenth amendment hold-
ing, it is commonplace as an expression of the constitutional principles
of federalism. 7 Principles of federalism restrain federal courts when
5. Id. at 176-82.
6. One hundred years ago, in a case involving a federal indictment of a state judge for
acts done in his official capacity, Justice Field wrote: "The proceeding is a gross offense to
the State: it is an attack upon her sovereignty in matters over which she has never surren-
dered her jurisdiction. The doctrine which sustains it, carried to its logical results, would
degrade and sink her to the level of a mere local municipal corporation .... ." Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 370 (1879) (Field, J., dissenting). See also Claybrooks v. State, 36
Md. App. 295, 307 n.7, 374 A.2d 365, 372 (1977): "The relationship that exists between the
State and its municipalities on the one hand and the federal government and the States on
the other is vastly different. Municipalities derive their authority and such sovereignty as
they may have from the State. They are creatures of the State and if the State confers no
authority upon them, they have none. The federal government is limited to the power
vested in it by the States through the ratification of the Constitution. By the tenth amend-
ment, the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. Thus, the federal
government also derives its power from the States. It has no more authority than the states
have given it .... "
7. There is also a growing body of commentary, led by Professors Michelman and
Tribe of Harvard, on the Court's decisions affecting the federal balance. A symposium on
federalism issues, dedicated to Justice Brennan, who dissented in National League of Cities v.
Usery, appears at 86 YALE L.J. 1015-1296 (1977). Both Michelman and Tribe suggest the
Court is approaching the idea that states are constitutionally obligated to provide minimum
governmental services. See Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of
"So vereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977); Tribe, Unrav-
eling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Gov-
ernmental Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1977). Tribe summarized his own tenth
amendment theory in his hombook. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 300-319
(1978). For other discussions of federalism and the tenth amendment, see Tribe, Intergov-
ernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in
Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682 (1976); Note, At Federalism's Cross-
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decreeing school desegregation or prison reform.8 Principles of feder-
alism have guided the development of the eleventh amendment prohi-
bition against suing the state in federal court. 9 Justice Harlan's
longstanding opposition to the "incorporation" of the Bill of Rights
into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment was based on
the "essentially federal nature of our national government,". . . one
of whose basic virtues is to leave ample room for governmental and
social experimentation in a society as diverse as ours, and which also
reflects the view of the Framers that "the security of liberty in
America rested primarily upon the dispersion of governmental power
across a federal system."' 0
The principles of federalism that lead the Court to restrain congres-
sional action in League of Cities are rooted in the same concerns.
It is the thesis of this Article that a great deal of tenth amendment
authority lies undiscovered in the Supreme Court reports. Many hold-
ings never have been labelled as tenth amendment authority because of
the assumption that the amendment merely states a truism.'I Now,
however, the amendment has surfaced and League of Cities is only the
tip of a tenth amendment iceberg. The iceberg is not made of tenth
amendment cases, but of eleventh amendment cases. For one hundred
years, the Court has dealt with state sovereignty and the federal-state
balance in the name of the eleventh amendment.
The Tip of the Iceberg
Two years before writing the plurality opinion in League of Cities,
Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion in Edelman v. Jordan,'2
holding that the eleventh amendment barred an award of damages
against the state in federal court. Over the dissent of four justices,
Edelman overruled portions of prior decisions that had awarded dam-
ages against the state, most notably Shapiro v. Thompson.'3 Two years
later, in the 1976 decision, Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 4 Justice Rehnquist,
roads: NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery, 57 B.U.L. REV. 178 (1977); Note, Municoal Bank-
ruptcy, The Tenth Amendment and New Federalism, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1871 (1976).
8. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 n.9 (1978); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S.
267, 280-81 (1977).
9. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
10. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 133 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting At-
lantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 285 (1970);
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 173 (1968)).
11. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
12. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
13. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
14. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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with two concurrences but without dissent, refined Edelman by ruling
that Congress could invade eleventh amendment immunity in exercise
of the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 5
Fitzpatrick was decided four days after League of Cities and cites
that case for contrast:' 6 Congress can invade the eleventh amendment
to enforce the fourteenth, while Congress may not invade the tenth
amendment in exercise of the commerce clause. Whether the citation
to League of Cities was meant to contrast the nature of the tenth and
eleventh amendments or was meant to contrast congressional power
under the commerce clause and the fourteenth amendment is not re-
vealed. In light of Milliken v. Bradley,"' decided the following term, it
was meant to do neither.
In Milliken, the state of Michigan had been ordered to pay half the
cost of a remedial reading program to relieve the effects of segregation
in Detroit schools. Michigan raised both tenth and eleventh amend-
ment defenses to the court's jurisdiction and power to enter the decree.
On the eleventh amendment issue, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the
Court, cited Edelman and held that the decree did not award money
damages, but granted only prospective equitable relief.'8 Fitzpatrick
was not cited in the eleventh amendment portion of the decision. In-
stead, Fitzpatrick, and not League of Cities, was cited for the tenth
amendment holding:
[T]here is no merit to petitioners' claims that the relief ordered here
violates the Tenth Amendment and general principles of federalism.
The Tenth Amendment's reservation of nondelegated powers to the
States is not implicated by a federal court judgment enforcing the
express prohibitions of unlawful state conduct enacted by the Four-
teenth Amendment. Cf Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer. . . . Nor are principles
of federalism abrogated by the decree. The District Court has
neither attempted to restructure local governmental entities nor to
mandate a particular method or structure of state or local
financing. 19
It is peculiar that Milliken cites an eleventh amendment case in its
discussion of the effect of the decree upon local government. Since at
least 1890, the Supreme Court has held the eleventh amendment inap-
plicable to actions against local governments,20 and a few months
before Milliken, Mr. Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed that proposition for a
15. Id at 456.
16. Id. at 453 n.9.
17. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
18. Id. at 290 n.22.
19. Id at 291.
20. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530-31 (1890).
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unanimous Court.21
It is even more peculiar that Milliken cites Fitzpatrick for the prop-
osition that a federal court can enforce the fourteenth amendment
without implicating the tenth. In Milliken, there was no discussion of
whether Congress had created an action aimed particularly at state de-
fendants, although that fact was crucial in Fitzpatrick.2 2
If the Court in Milliken meant to add some explanation of its tenth
amendment holding by a contrasting citation, League of Cities would
have been more appropriate. League of Cities at least involved the
tenth amendment. Also, like Milliken, it involved a federal intrusion
into the state's manner of doing governmental business. In League of
Cities, Mr. Justice Rehnquist reasoned that "[o]ne undoubted attribute
of state sovereignty" was the power to control "functions essential to
separate and independent existence. ' 23 The tenth amendment forbids
Congress to significantly alter or displace the states' abilities to control
its essential functions.24 The Court mentioned "fire prevention, police
protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation" to be
among these essential functions and concluded, "Indeed, it is functions
such as these which governments are created to provide, services such
as these which the States have traditionally afforded their citizens. '25
Threats to the "separate and independent existence" of the state
and intrusions upon matters traditionally local should have been the
concern of the Court in Milliken in applying the tenth amendment. In-
deed, the Court in Milliken apparently assumed that education is also a
traditional function of local government, but nevertheless permitted the
intrusion because the tenth amendment was not implicated by enforce-
ment of the fourteenth.
For the proposition that the enforcement clause of the fourteenth
amendment is a special power in the federal arsenal, Milliken might
have contrasted League of Cities and Fitzpatrick: Congress under the
fourteenth amendment may tread where under the commerce clause it
may not. However, that proposition is not very useful in Milliken
where the Court, not Congress, encroached upon the state. Fitzpatrick
unmistakably recognized congressional power to provide a remedy that
the Court was powerless to impose.
The citation to Fitzpatrick may have been as authority for the
21. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-81 (1977).
22. 427 U.S. at 456.
23. 426 U.S. at 845.
24. Id
25. Id at 851.
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technique of decision making by 6pse dixii. In Fitzpatrick, Mr. Justice
Rehnquist had simply stated, "[W]e think that the Eleventh Amend-
ment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies. . . are
necessarily limited by the enforcement provision of section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. '2 6 In an equally conclusory fashion, the
Court in Milliken, simply declared, "The Tenth Amendment's reserva-
tion of nondelegated powers to the States is not implicated by a federal-
court judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of unlawful State
conduct enacted by the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 27 The Court offered
no reason or authority for its conclusions in either case.
Although the holdings in both Fitzpatrick and Milliken are mere
Opse dixit, it is unfair to charge the Court with elevating the technique
to a recognized principle of decisionmaking. The Court had little gui-
dance in history or precedent to help resolve the conflict between the
eleventh amendment and congressional enforcement of the fourteenth
amendment in Fitzpatrick. Ultimately, the question could turn on
nothing other than the Supreme Court's opinion, consistent with its no-
tions of federalism.
The Court confronted the same dilemma in Milliken. Is the mini-
mal sovereignty constitutionally guaranteed to states invaded by a fed-
erally ordered remedial reading program? With no guidance and no
way to avoid the issue, the Court could ultimately do no more than
state its own opinion.
If these were cases of first impression the Court should have
turned to basic principles and analogous problems for guidance. If
these were not cases of first impression the Court should have cited and
applied the controlling authority. However, the Court used neither
technique. The Court merely stated its conclusion in each case. This
defect in the Court's opinion-writing function may not necessarily im-
ply a corresponding defect in the decisionmaking function. However,
an overwhelming inference of the opse dixit technique is that the deci-
sion was formulated at a subconscious level, bolstered by a sense of
moral certitude, but not yet ripe for intellectual explanation. This may
represent a problem both with discerning the governing principles as
well as with defining the precise issues.
This section has been devoted to demonstrating the seeming con-
fusion the Court suffers in the areas of the tenth and eleventh amend-
ments. The Court refers to tenth and eleventh amendment cases
26. 427 U.S. at 456.
27. 433 U.S. at 291.
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interchangeably, and for propositions unrelated to their respective
holdings. Nonetheless, the Court does recognize questions of states'
rights or federalism and is prepared to inquire whether constitutionally
protected state sovereignty has been invaded.
Unfortunately, the Court has not articulated precisely what factors
have influenced any given result. Instead, the Court summarily con-
cludes that the tenth amendment, the eleventh amendment, the four-
teenth amendment, "principles of federalism," or traditional notions of
the essential functions of local government compel the decision. The
results being compelled, however, are inconsistent with previous tenth
and eleventh amendment law. The purpose of this Article is to identify
the considerations that have influenced the Court in deciding particular
cases. But, more important, the purpose of this Article is to identify the
issues the Court actually confronts in a conflict over state and federal
domain.
Eleventh Amendment Law
The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
or Subjects of any Foreign State.28
The eleventh amendment is misleading without a discussion of
eleventh amendment "law." As will become plain, the language of the
amendment gives little indication of the meaning given it by the Court.
The language refers to judicial power in the same terms as the constitu-
tional grant of power in article III, section 2, clause 1, which provides
that "[tihe judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity
...between a State and Citizens of another State. . .and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects." 29
It would appear from the similarity of language that the eleventh
amendment withdrew part of what article III conferred: jurisdiction of
the federal courts. It is fundamental that subject matter jurisdiction
cannot be conferred upon a federal court by consent of the parties. 30 It
has always been held, however, that a state may consent to be sued in
federal court despite the eleventh amendment. 3'
If the eleventh amendment is not a restriction of the federal judi-
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
29. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
30. Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 125, 126 (1804).
31. See Annot., 50 L. Ed. 2d 928, 951-60 (1978).
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cial power, what is it? In Hans v. Louisiana32 the Court treated it as a
canon of construction when interpreting article III. Emphasizing the
amendment's language that federal judicial power not be construed to
embrace suits by "citizens of another state" against a state, the court
refused to construe article III to authorize suits against a state by its
own citizens:
Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, it
was understood to be left open for citizens of a State to sue their own
state in the federal courts, whilst the idea of suits by citizens of other
states, or of foreign states was indignantly repelled? Suppose that
Congress, when proposing the Eleventh Amendment, had appended
to it a proviso that nothing therein contained should prevent a State
from being sued by its own citizens in cases arising under the Consti-
tution or laws of the United States: can we imagine that it would
have been adopted by the States? The supposition that it would is
almost an absurdity on its face.
The truth is, that the cognizance of suits and actions unknown to
the law, and forbidden by the law, was not contemplated by the Con-
stitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States.33
Although universally treated as an eleventh amendment case,
Hans v. Louisiana was really an interpretation of article III and merely
looked to the eleventh amendment for guidance. Hans also looked for
guidance to Hamilton, writing in number eighty-one of The Federalist:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the
suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and
the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the
attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every
State in the Union. 34
Written before ratification of the Constitution, this passage of The
Federalist suggested that no power had been conferred on the federal
government to invade the immunity that the states enjoyed. Powers not
delegated to the United States are reserved to the states and the people
by the tenth amendment.35
In fact, the Court in Hans needed neither the eleventh nor tenth
amendment to reach its result. While article III expressly granted and
the eleventh amendment later withdrew jurisdiction to cases "between
a state and citizens of another State," there had never been a grant of
jurisdiction to cases between a state and its own citizens. Hans should
32. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
33. Id. at 15.
34. THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamilton), quoted in 134 U.S. at 13.
35. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X.
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have been an easy case, a simple matter of reading article III to see if
the grant of jurisdiction were there. Instead, the Court relied on an ill-
defined tradition of state sovereignty as a canon of constitutional con-
struction. Although there was no mention of the tenth amendment in
Hans, the canon of construction was remembered by Mr. Justice Rehn-
quist when he dissented from the tenth amendment holding in Fry v.
United States.36 After discussing Hans and quoting from it at length,
Justice Rehnquist observed:
As it was not the Eleventh Amendment by its terms which justified
the result in Hans, it is not the Tenth Amendment by its terms that
prohibits congressional action which sets a mandatory ceiling on the
wages of all state employees. Both Amendments are simply exam-
ples of the understanding of those who drafted and ratified the Con-
stitution that the States were sovereign in many respects . . .37
To Justice Rehnquist, the tenth and eleventh amendments are "exam-
ples" of state sovereignty explicitly provided for by the Constitution.
They illustrate an understanding on behalf of the drafters that is useful
in interpreting all of its provisions. The Constitution was intended to
vest in the United States certain enumerated powers, and in all other
respects the states remained sovereign.
Although the provisions of the Constitution should be construed so
as to accommodate and preserve state sovereignty, the Constitution
also imposes certain express prohibitions on the states. As to those
matters the states have no sovereign interest to preserve or protect.
Consistent with the idea that the states have no sovereign interests in
those matters, the Court could declare in Prout v. Starr:38
It would, indeed, be most unfortunate if the immunity of the individ-
ual States from suits by citizens of other States, provided for in the
Eleventh Amendment, were to be interpreted as nullifying those
other provisions which confer power on Congress to regulate com-
merce among the States, which forbid the States from entering into
any treaty, alliance or confederation, from passing any bill of attain-
der, expostfacto law or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or
without the consent of Congress, from laying any duty of tonnage,
entering into any agreement or compact with other States, or from
engaging in war,-all of which provisions existed before the adoption
of the Eleventh Amendment, which still exist, and which would be
nullified and made of no effect, if the judicial power of the United
States could not be invoked to protect citizens affected by the passage
of state laws disregarding these constitutional limitations.39
36. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
37. Id at 557 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
38. 188 U.S. 537 (1903).
39. Id at 543.
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Although the eleventh amendment was meant to protect the sover-
eignty of the states, it does not immunize state conduct in matters
where the states have yielded their sovereignty. As to those matters the
state is not sovereign. It acts as any individual might act in violating
the law and, as an individual, is liable to suit. Consistent with that
notion, the Court had earlier declared in Exparte Virginia4° that "[t]he
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the States,
and they are to a degree restrictions of State power. It is these which
Congress is empowered to enforce, and to enforce against State action
... .Such enforcement is no invasion of State sovereignty." '4'
Ex parte Virginia also was not an eleventh amendment case. It
involved a petition for habeas corpus by Judge J.D. Coles who had
been arrested and indicted for excluding black citizens from jury serv-
ice. According to Mr. Justice Strong, writing for the Court, the states
had surrendered their sovereignty by virtue of section 5 of the four-
teenth amendment. According to Mr. Justice Field, writing in dissent,
the states still retained sovereignty which limited congressional power:
"The new [federal] government being one of granted powers, its au-
thority was limited by them and such as were necessarily implied for
their execution. But lest, from a misconception of their extent, these
powers might be abused, the Tenth Amendment was at an early day
adopted .... ,,42 Conceding that Congress was granted power to pro-
tect civil rights by the thirteenth amendment, Justice Field still thought
that "it confers no political rights; it leaves the States free, as before its
adoption, to determine who shall hold their offices and participate in
the administration of their laws."' 43 Therefore, Justice Field concluded
that indictment of a state judge for acts done in his official capacity was
unconstitutional.
The proceeding is a gross offence to the State; it is an attack upon her
sovereignty in matters over which she has never surrendered her ju-
risdiction. The doctrine which sustains it, carried to its logical re-
sults, would degrade and sink her to the level of a mere local
municipal corporation. 44
Only Justice Field mentioned the tenth amendment in Ex parte
Virginia, but both the majority and dissent addressed the same issue:
whether the states, in conferring power upon Congress to protect the
rights of citizenship under the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments,
40. 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
41. Id at 346.
42. Id at 357 (Field, J., dissenting).
43. Id at 363 (Field, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 370 (Field, J. dissenting). See text accompanying note 6 supra.
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had given Congress the power to invade the otherwise sovereign state
realm of its administration of just laws.
From Prout v. Starr and Exparte Virginia45 emerges the principle
that the state enjoys protection under the eleventh amendment only
when acting in its sovereign capacity. A logical corollary to this princi-
ple is that when a state officer acts to enforce an unconstitutional state
law, the state is not acting in its sovereign capacity and therefore enjoys
no sovereign immunity that shields the state or its agents from liability.
Much of the confusion with respect to modern eleventh amendment
law can be traced to the fact that the Court in Exparte Young failed to
reach that conclusion.
In Exparte Young, the lower court enjoined Attorney General Ed-
ward Young of Minnesota from enforcing an unconstitutional state law
and committed him for contempt when he disobeyed the decree.
Young raised an eleventh amendment objection, relying on In re
Ayer 46 wherein the lower court had committed for contempt Attorney
General Rufus Ayers of Virginia. Underlying the contempt in Ayers
was a decree of specific performance of a contract to which the state
was a party. Ayers held that a state officer could be sued for his indi-
vidual wrongs, such as a trespass, but if the offense could only be com-
mitted by the state acting through its agent, then the agents could
defend by asserting that the suit was really against the state and was
barred by the eleventh amendment.
Following Ayers, Exparte Young might have held that Young was
acting as the agent of Minnesota when enforcing its laws and that the
suit was really against the state. Such a conclusion would not mean,
however, that the suit was automatically barred. According to Prout v.
Starr and Exparte Virginia, the states enjoy immunity only when act-
ing constitutionally. If Minnesota were acting unconstitutionally it
could be enjoined even when sued directly. The Court in Ex parte
Young did remark that "the use of the name of the State to enforce an
unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding with-
out the authority of and one which does not affect the State in its sover-
eign or governmental capacity."'47 Although the state has no right to
enforce an unconstitutional law, it unquestionably has the power to do
so until confronted by a greater power preventing it. And when the
State acts outside its sovereign powers it still acts through agents. Min-
nesota payed Young to enforce the law. To hold that Young was not
45. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
46. 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
47. 209 U.S. at 159.
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the agent of Minnesota when enforcing the statute is ridiculous. Would
Minnesota be free to hire Green to enforce the statute after Young was
enjoined? Could Minnesota then hire Black to enforce the statute after
Green was enjoined? The point is, could a federal court enjoin Minne-
sota itself, or is the only relief against unconstitutional state action a
hope of voluntary compliance. In the seventy years since Ex parte
Young, the Court has yet to clearly answer these questions.4
Exparte Young held that the Attorney General was not the agent
of the state when acting to enforce an unconstitutional statute,49 citing
In re Ayers.50 From Ayers, the Court in Young took the phrase that
has since become the name of the rule in Young: "stripping doctrine."
In re Ayers had stated:
If. . . an individual, acting under the assumed authority of a State,
as one of its officers, and under color of its laws, comes into conflict
with the superior authority of a valid law of the United States, he is
stripped of his representative character, and subjected in his person
to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no
power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the
supreme authority of the United States.51
Ayers adopted a rule of stripping the state officer of his official capacity
when he acted outside the scope of his authority. That is not the same
as saying an officer acting within the scope of his authority ceases to be
the agent of the state because the state action is unconstitutional. In
Ayers, the official was stripped of his official immunity in circum-
stances where the state had no immunity to impart to him. The ration-
ale in Ayers is much different from the rationale in Young, where the
official was stripped of his official authority but the state remained im-
mune. Ayers was based on constitutional law; Young was based on
agency law. The agency principle was stated most clearly in the con-
curring opinion of Mr. Justice Field:
To enjoin the officers of the Commonwealth, charged with the super-
vision and management of legal proceedings in her behalf, from
bringing suits in her name, is nothing less than to enjoin the Com-
monwealth, for only by her officers can such suits be instituted and
48. Although the Supreme Court has never held that the order may be directly binding
against the state, the Court will sustain a fine against the state for contempt if it does not
obey: "If a state agency refuses to adhere to a court order, a financial penalty may be the
most effective means of insuring compliance. The principles of federalism that inform Elev-
enth Amendment doctrine surely do not require federal courts to enforce their decrees only
by sending high state officials to jail." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691 (1978) (footnote
omitted).
49. 209 U.S. at 160.
50. 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
51. Id. at 507.
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prosecuted. This seems to me an obvious conclusion.52
The conclusion was not obvious to the majority in Exparte Young.
Settled principles would have justified the result in Young without re-
sort to the fiction that actual authority evaporated whenever the state
action was unconstitutional. Why then did Young create an unneces-
sary and fictitious agency rule? The only reason the opinion offers is
that the state, having no authority, could confer none upon an agent.5 3
However, this obscures the point that a state having the power, could
nevertheless confer that power upon its agent. The legacy of the
agency rule in Young is a checkerboard of judicial remedies available
to citizens injured by unconstitutional state conduct: officials may
sometimes be enjoined, but damages cannot be recovered from the
state.54
Ex parte Young and Exparte Virginia have each figured promi-
nently in Justice Rehnquist's analysis of eleventh amendment
problems. As already noted, Justice Rehnquist cited Hans v.
Louisiana55 in his tenth amendment dissent in Fry v. United States.5 6
In addition to the holdings and language of these cases, one passage
from In re ,4yers helps explain modem notions of federalism:
The very object and purpose of the I th Amendment were to prevent
the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial
tribunals at the instance of private parties. It was thought to be
neither becoming nor convenient that the several States of the Union,
invested with that large residuum of sovereignty which had not been
delegated to the United States, should be summoned as defendants to
answer the complaints of private persons. .... 57
Although the passage names the eleventh amendment, it speaks of
the "residuum of sovereignty" preserved by the tenth amendment.
While the Court frequently mentions the eleventh amendment when
reviewing a suit by a citizen against a state in federal court, behind the
question of whether federal courts have jurisdiction is a more complex
inquiry into the nature of the action and whether federal power in-
trudes upon the sovereign realm of the state.
Hans v. Louisiana did not involve the eleventh amendment at all.
Prout v. Starr spoke of matters carved out of the states' sovereign
realm. Exparte Virginia was clearly a tenth amendment case. In re
Ayers and Exparte Young, nominally eleventh amendment cases, were
52. Id at 508 (Field, J., concurring).
53. 209 U.S. at 160.
54. See text accompanying notes 62-67 infra.
55. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
56. See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra.
57. 123 U.S. at 505.
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identical upon their jurisdictional facts. Underlying both were suits by
citizens against the attorney general of the state for equitable relief in
federal court. The eleventh amendment barred the action in Ayers but
not in Young.
The distinction lies only in the merits underlying each case. Min-
nesota acted unconstitutionally while Virginia acted constitutionally.
Actions that successfully challenge unconstitutional state action do not
intrude upon "that large residuum of sovereignty" preserved to the
states.
Incorporating what were commonly regarded as eleventh amend-
ment decisions, the amendment might have been restated as follows in
1908, the year of Exparte Young:
Jurisdiction of the Courts of the United States shall not be exercised
in any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted by Citizens of
any state against one of the United States in its sovereign capacity
without its consent.
The italicized portions represent principles not expressed by the
amendment as it is actually written. Certainly the most unwieldly con-
cept is the notion of "sovereign capacity." That concept seems to be-
long more properly under the tenth amendment. It seeks to balance the
reserved and delegated powers of the states and the United States so as
to assure the integrity of the federal constitution against state iniquity
without indiscriminately subjecting the state to suits by private citizens.
The constitutional source of "sovereign capacity" may seem irrele-
vant since the Court recognizes the concept without examining its pedi-
gree. Its ancestry, however, may become important when the Court
looks at the relationship of state and federal power. While the eleventh
amendment refers only to judicial power, the tenth amendment limits
Congress as well.
Between Exparte Young, 58 in 1908, and Edelman v. Jordan,59 in
1974, a number of cases reached the Supreme Court upon the issue of
state consent to suit.60 Through doctrines of implied consent, construc-
tive consent, waiver, implied waiver, and finally, compelled waiver, the
Court imposed its own notions of the circumstances in which a state
should be amenable to suit even though no "consent" was ever ex-
pressed by the state. Apart from cases involving actual or implied in
fact consent, the burdens of persuasion, presumptions, inferences, and
58. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
59. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
60. See Comment, Implied Waiver of a State's Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 1974
DUKE L.J. 925; Annot., 50 L. Ed. 2d 928 (1978).
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miscellaneous rules of construing statutes and governmental activities
derive from the Court's notions of which governmental functions, fed-
eral or state, are more important and from the Court's notions of the
proper relationship of federal and state activity.
The entire body of consent "in law" rather than "in fact" and even
the concept of consent itself is anathematic to all notions of limited
federal jurisdiction. Consent is the prerogative of sovereignty in a de-
mocracy. Government in the United States exists only by the consent
of the governed. The federal government was created by the consent of
the states, by the states conferring certain enumerated sovereign powers
upon the new federal entity. The states still retain the power to confer
powers upon the federal government under article V by amending the
federal constitution. If an individual state may expand the power of
the federal government by consent, the ability to confer power by con-
sent must be a power reserved to the states. Anytime the Court con-
structs "in law" a state consent prerequisite to federal action it tinkers
with the very federal structure by adjusting the powers delegated to
Congress or reserved to the states.
State consent to otherwise prohibited federal action is a tenth
amendment issue. The fact that the federal action consented to in these
cases is exercise of federal judicial power does not convert the problem
into an eleventh amendment issue. What powers a state may confer by
consent without use of the amendment machinery and whether the con-
sent is constitutionally satisfactory in a given case are questions con-
cerning the powers reserved to the state and are tenth amendment
problems. 61
61. In 1977, the Oregon Court of Appeals held that Oregon had title to the submersible
lands underlying navigable waters by virtue of the sovereignty reserved by the tenth amend-
ment. The court distinguished the state's/usprivatum interest, the usual proprietary rights of
private ownership, and thejuspublicum interest, the overriding public interest in controlling
navigable waters. The court then stated that/iuspublicum ownership carried a corresponding
obligation to act on behalf of the public.
"The right of the public to use the waterways for [commerce, fishing and recreation] has
always been recognized at common law. As representative of the people, the sovereign bears
the responsibility to preserve these rights. Unlike the state's .usprivaum interest, the .us
publicum cannot be alienated .... In essence, the juspublicum is a nondelegable govern-
ment obligation." Brusco Towboat Co. v. State, 30 Or. App. 509, 517-18, 567 P.2d 1037,
1043-44 (1977) (citations omitted). For a discussion of the theory that states are obligated to
provide certain services, see the materials by Professors Michelman and Tribe cited in note 7
su.pra.
Can Congress legitimately regulate a matter traditionally reserved to the states, based
upon state consent to the regulation, if the state's juspublicum interest is truly inalienable
and nondelegable? A rule of inalienability under the tenth amendment would have a signifi-
cant impact on the "consensual" regulation Congress imposes under the spending power.
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Only one major eleventh amendment case not dealing with con-
sent reached the Supreme Court between Exparte Young and Edelman
v. Jordan. In Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,62 a citizen
sued the state of Indiana for a tax refund. Relying on In re Ayers, the
Court looked to "the essential nature and effect of the proceeding" to
determine if the suit were really against the state. The Court treated
one factor as conclusive of that issue: "[W]hen the action is in essence
one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, sub-
stantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immu-
nity from suit even though individual officials are nominal
defendants. '63 This rule is good common sense. However, the princi-
ple of agency law on which Ford Motor Co. relies is inconsistent with
the rule of Exparte Young that a state official's authority disintegrates
whenever the state action is unconstitutional.
The Court in Ford Motor Co. blithely overlooked the inconsis-
tency in Ex Iarte Young. In Edelman v. Jordan,64 Mr. Justice Rehn-
quist wedded Young to Ford Motor Co. and concluded that the
eleventh amendment permitted equitable relief but barred recovery of
damages.65 In Exparte Young the Court had discussed the inadequacy
of an action for damages in order to establish the propriety of the in-
junction it affirmed. Exparte Young neither held nor hinted that dam-
ages were not recoverable. In fact, Justice Rehnquist never declared
that Young stood for that proposition, nevertheless, by emphasizing
that Young awarded equitable relief, Justice Rehnquist implies that
damages were barred. At one point, Justice Rehnquist referred to "the
difference between the type of relief barred by the Eleventh Amend-
ment and that permitted under Ex parte Young."' 66 Juxtaposition in
that manner is either grossly inartful or intended to mislead and dis-
guise the flaw in the authority.
Young is authority for the kind of relief permitted. The eleventh
amendment is authority for the kind of relief barred. Through sentence
structure, Justice Rehnquist implies that Young is authority for the
kind of relief barred.
Even if a strict rule of inalienability were not adopted, the Supreme Court should consider
the jus publicum obligation when confronted with assertions of implied and constructive
state consent. The issue should be treated as an adjustment in the balance of federal and
state power, the central tenth amendment concern.
62. 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
63. Id. at 464.
64. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
65. Id. at 668-69.
66. Id at 667.
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Ford Motor Co. also was not authority for the result in Edelman.
The rule announced in Ford Motor Co. concerning damages was in-
tended to assist the Court when looking behind the nominal parties to
discover whether the state was the real party in interest. The fact that
the suit was actually against a state defendant in Ford Motor Co. did
not dispose of the eleventh amendment issue. Although the Court went
on to consider the issue of consent to suit, the Court should have con-
tinued and inquired whether the suit were against the state in its sover-
eign capacity. Mr. Justice Rehnquist did not cite Ford Motor Co. as
authority for the result in Edelman. Instead, he declared, "Were we to
uphold [the damage award], we would be obligated to overrule the
Court's holding in Ford Motor Co."' 67 However, Ford Motor Co. did
not hold that damage awards against the state were barred. Therefore,
any overruling of FordMotor Co. would have to be based upon some
other issue.
Just because there was no authority for the result in Edelman does
not make the case wrong. Edelman, like previous cases, read the elev-
enth amendment through the lens of history. With that prismatic per-
spective, Mr. Justice Rehnquist could read, "any suit in law or equity,"
to mean, "all suits in law or equity." Moreover, Edelman required state
consent only for actions for damages; equitable relief could be granted
over state protest.
In Edelman, Mr. Justice Rehnquist focused sharply on one is-
sue-money damages. It was not important whether the money was
awarded as legal or equitable relief; an attempt to characterize the
damage award as equitable restitution was brushed aside as irrelevant.
The important fact was that money would be awarded to remedy past
shortcomings. To be sure, the prayer for damages in Ford Motor Co.
had been the dispositive fact, convincing the Court that the state was
the real party in interest. Even more pointedly, the Court had re-
marked in one of the consent cases, Great Northern Life Insurance Co.
v. Read,68 "[W]hen we are dealing with the sovereign exemption from
judicial interference in the vital field of financial administration a clear
declaration of the state's intention to submit its fiscal problems to other
courts than those of its own creation must be found."' 69 The import of
this statement goes beyond mere reference to the eleventh amendment.
67. Id at 668.
68. 322 U.S. 47 (1944).
69. Id at 54.
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It seems to invoke the "principles of equity, comity and federalism"70
that caution the Court to act with restraint when it decrees a course of
remedial state action.
In the recent case of Hutto v. Finney,7I attorney's fees had been
awarded against the State Department of Corrections, to be paid out of
Department funds, for bad faith noncompliance with court orders.72
Citing Edelman, the Court held that the eleventh amendment coun-
seled moderation in the amount of the award. 73 Much more important,
however, the Court held that the "principles of federalism that inform
Eleventh Amendment doctrine" gravitated toward the "less intrusive"
remedy of a monetary award rather than sending state officials to jail.74
The Court's concern over damage awards against the state may
emanate from the eleventh amendment but certainly is not limited to
the scope of the amendment. The year before Edelman, the Court
decided Employees v. Department of Public Health and Welfare,75 an
action brought by state employees against the state department of pub-
lic health. The court held that implementation of congressional policy
as set forth in the Fair Labor Standards Act did not divest a state of its
sovereignty and allow it to be sued in federal court by its own citizens.
The Act provided that the United States Secretary of Labor could bring
suit to vindicate the rights of state employees. States are immune from
attacks by their own citizens, but the Constitution does not bar a suit by
the United States against a state.76 The Court went on to note that
while Congress might allow an employee to recover double damages
against a private employer, Congress, in the interests of harmonious
federalism, undoubtedly did not intend to allow an employee (citizen)
to recover double damages against a state employer.77 This same con-
cern is expressed by the Court in Hutto v. Finney where an award
against the state was proper under the eleventh amendment, but special
considerations applied when the state treasury was endangered: "Al-
though the Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit attorney's fees
70. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971).
71. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
72. The Court noted that it would have been better form to assess the award against the
state officials rather than the Department but that this did not constitute reversible error. Id
at 692-93.
73. Id. at 692 n. 18.
74. Id. at 691.
75. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
76. Id. at 285-86.
77. Id. at 286.
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awards for bad faith, it may counsel moderation in determining the size
of the award or in giving the State time to adjust its budget before
paying the full amount of the fee." 78
Federalism was the concern in Employees. Federalism was proba-
bly the real concern underlying Great Northern Lfe and Edelman.
Whether Congress could regulate the salaries of state employees was
the tenth amendment problem before the Court in Fry v. United States
and National League of Cities v. Usery. In League of Cities, Mr. Justice
Blackmun had concurred upon principles of federalism, with no effort
to derive those principles from any specific constitutional provision.79
In Hutto v. Finney, the Court vaguely referred to "(tihe principles of
federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine." 80 In Milliken
v. Bradley,8' which decreed that the state share the cost of a remedial
educational program, the Court distinguished that kind of fiscal intru-
sion from the damage award sought in Edelman: "In contrast to
Edelman, there was no money award here in favor of respondent Brad-
ley or any member of his class. This case simply does not involve indi-
vidual citizens conducting a raid on the state treasury." 82 Money is not
the true concern in Milliken; the true concern is whose rights are at
stake. Bradley was not acting to vindicate only his own rights. The
decree he sought would enforce the fourteenth amendment for the ben-
efit of the entire Detroit community. This formulation is essentially a
private attorney general theory, a familiar device in the Supreme
Court. In 1968, the Court had declared:
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that
enforcement would prove difficult and that the Nation would have to
rely in part upon private litigation as a means of securing broad com-
pliance with the law. A Title II suit is thus private in form only.
en a plaintiff brings an action under that Title, he cannot recover
damages. If he obtains an injunction, he does so not for himself
alone but also as a "private attorney general," vindicating a policy
that Congress considered of the highest priority.8 3
In distinguishing injunctive relief from damages, the Court in Edelman
quoted from an appellate decision:
It is one thing to tell the Commissioner of Social Services that he
must comply with the federal standards for the future if the state is to
78. 437 U.S. at 692 n.18.
79. 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
80. 437 U.S. at 691.
81. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
82. Id at 290 n.22.
83. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1968). See also Chris-
tiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
July 1979]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
have the benefit of federal funds in the programs he administers. It is
quite another thing to order the Commissioner to use state funds to
make reparation for the past.84
Injunctive relief is measured by the federal standards involved,
while damages are measured by the invasion of private rights involved.
The Court seems to treat enforcement of federal standards as a suit
brought by the United States under a private attorney general theory,
while holding that damages for the individual wrongs do not fall within
the private attorney general theory and are therefore suits brought by
citizens, barred by the eleventh amendment. States must consent to
suits otherwise within the eleventh amendment. The Court permitted
the injunctive relief in Edelman despite its finding that the state had not
consented. Nonetheless, because the damage action required state con-
sent, it was barred. It is worth repeating the language distinguishing
Edelman in Milliken v. Bradley: "In contrast to Edelman, there was no
money award here in favor of respondent Bradley or any member" of
his class. This case simply does not involve individual citizens' con-
ducting a raid on the state treasury for an accrued monetary
liability."85
These results suggest that the Court has adopted a rule permitting
it to look behind the nominal plaintiff to determine the real party in
interest for the purpose of the eleventh amendment, much as it looks
behind the nominal defendant to determine if the state is the real party
in interest. Just as a state officer who is not sued on behalf of his state
employer may be "stripped" of his official immunity, so a private citi-
zen who sues on behalf of the United States may be "clothed" with its
standing to sue.
As previously suggested, the lack of authority for the result in
Edelman does not make the case necessarily wrong. A private attorney
general theory that distinguishes the public and private elements of an
action makes Edelman nearly right. Moreover, a private attorney gen-
eral theory helps explain why concerns over federalism so frequently
arise when damages are sought against the state. Damages may some-
times be an appropriate remedy to enforce the public rights. In Fitzpat-
rick v. Bitzer,86 the Court held that Congress could, "for the purpose of
enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for
private suits against States."' 87 These private suits may be created both
84. 415 U.S. at 665 (quoting Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972), cert
denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1973)).
85. 433 U.S. at 290.
86. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
87. Id. at 456.
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for the purpose of redressing private rights and for assuring state com-
pliance with constitutional obligations. Although individual civil rights
are involved, the federal government is charged with protecting them.
When treated as a remedy imposed for the purpose of assuring future
compliance, damages measured by past wrongdoing are in a sense pu-
nitive. Although the damages compensate the injured citizen, they do
not compensate the United States, the real party in interest. Thus, in
Employees the double damages against the state, provided for in a fed-
eral statute, were not allowed because they were inconsistent with "har-
monious federalism," even though the eleventh amendment did not
prohibit them. Yet, the Court, particularly in Bivens v. Six Unknown
NamedAgents,88 has recognized that recovery of damages measured by
the private injury can be an effective tool for enforcing constitutional
provisions by providing a disincentive for government violations while
offering an incentive for private policing. In the enforcement scheme,
the litigant acts as a private attorney general on behalf of the United
States even when seeking private damages.8 9
Perhaps the particular circumstances in Edelman compelled the
proper result. In that case damages may not have been necessary to
assure compliance with federal law. In other circumstances, damages
may be the necessary remedy. Congress decided that damages were
appropriate under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the
Court enforced that decision in Fitzpatrick. When the Court recognizes
its own power to enforce the Constitution, especially in institutional-
ized areas such as schools or prisons where nearly any relief orders a
state how to spend its money, the Court should not be inhibited in fash-
ioning the proper remedy by a rule prohibiting damages. 90 The true
test of whether damages are a proper remedy should be built upon
"principles of equity, comity and federalism." 9'
Edelman is a sound eleventh amendment case if a private attorney
88. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
89. See Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies.: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 1532 (1972).
90. In a school desegregation case, the Court remarked: "That the programs are also
'compensatory' in nature does not change the fact that they are part of a plan that operates
prospectively to bring about the delayed benefits of a unitary school system. We therefore
hold that such prospective relief is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment." Milliken v.
Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 290 (1977), wherein attorneys' fees were awarded against the state
officials for bad faith noncompliance with court orders. The Court remarked: "That the
award had a compensatory effect does not in any event distinguish it from a fine for civil
contempt, which also compensates a private party for the consequences of a contemnor's
disobedience." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691-92 n.17 (1978).
91. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972).
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general theory is applied, but it also inadvertently disposed of a tenth
amendment issue. Under a private attorney general theory the action
for an injunction to enforce federal law is a suit by the United States
and is therefore outside the eleventh amendment constraints; the action
for damages is a suit by private citizens against the state, the real party
in interest, and is barred by the eleventh amendment. Yet, in a proper
case, damages should be awarded against the state in an action by the
United States, when necessary to assure compliance with federal stand-
ards and when consistent with principles of comity, equity, and federal-
ism. Edelman explicitly decided that damages were not appropriate in
the private action. Edelman also impliedly decided that damages were
inappropriate in the public action to protect the rights of the United
States. Deciding whether the United States is the real plaintiff in inter-
est, enabling a court to entertain the suit at all, is an eleventh amend-
ment issue. Once it is decided that the United States is the real plaintiff
in interest, determining whether damages may be awarded is a tenth
amendment issue.
The Court would have done well to distinguish the tenth amend-
ment issue in Edelman. Two years later Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,92 an ac-
tion against a state under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
reached the Court. Acting under section 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment, Congress had previously amended Title VII to specifically pro-
vide for damage actions against states. The Court held that "the
Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it
embodies, see Hans v. Louisiana . . . , are necessarily limited by the
enforcement provisions of section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. '93
Clearly, the Supreme Court has stated that "Congress has plenary
power to set aside the State's immunity from retroactive relief in order
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment." 94 It was unnecessary for the
Court to decide that Congress could create a private damage action
despite the eleventh amendment, when the Court could have decided
that provision for damages was a necessary and proper exercise of con-
gressional power consistent with notions of harmonious federalism
under the tenth amendment. Indeed, the tenth amendment issue re-
mains unresolved.
Under a private attorney general theory, there is no eleventh
92. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
93. Id at 456.
94. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693 (1978) (explaining Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445 (1976)).
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amendment issue in Fitzpatrick. There is only the tenth amendment
issue: whether awarding damages is consistent with "harmonious feder-
alism." If the private litigant is not acting as an attorney general to
enforce constitutional obligations against the state, it is really not any
business of Congress to provide a forum for private disputes, as Con-
gress apparently has after Fitzpatrick. Outside the constitutional arena,
it is no concern of Congress how states deal with their own citizens.
The judicial power of the United States has never covered suits against
states by their own citizens. If the states are truly sovereign, they may
give or withhold relief according to their sovereign whim.
This power is not as harsh as it sounds, for if democracy works, the
sovereign whim is controlled by popular vote, and each state has its
own constitution and courts to check excessive majoritarian caprice.
Moreover, when the judicial power of the United States was construed
to cover suits against states by citizens of other states the eleventh
amendment promptly removed that power. It arguably might be a na-
tional concern how states treat nonresidents, but Congress should not
demand that nonresidents be treated better than residents. There are
sufficient safeguards of equal treatment in the full faith and credit
clause, privileges and immunities clause, equal protection clause, and
principles of comity. National League of Cities v. Usery95 held that the
tenth amendment preserved state sovereignty in "functions essential to
separate and independent existence."' 96 Nothing is more fundamental,
more essential to the states' separate and independent existence than
control of state government by its own citizens. The most basic tenet of
democratic government is that the governed choose how they will be
ruled. If the United States, the voice of the people of fifty states, is
permitted to tell Ohio or California what it must do with respect to its
own citizens, the people of Ohio or California become a minority in
their own state government.
The real issue in Fitzpatrick was not the eleventh amendment.
The real issue was whether awarding damages to private litigants who
enforced the Constitution against a state was consistent with the tenth
amendment. A congressional declaration that damages are appropriate
is entitled to some deference by the Court, but it is not crucial that
Congress make the declaration. The Court recognizes its own power to
mold remedies to enforce the fourteenth amendment. Not surprisingly,
the Court held in Milliken v. Bradley that "The Tenth Amendment's
95. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
96. Id at 845 (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911); Lane County v.
Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869)).
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reservation of nondelegated powers to the States is not implicated by a
federal court judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of unlawful
state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer. ' 97 By the fourteenth amendment the states delegated new pow-
ers to the United States. Exercise of those powers, whether by Con-
gress or the Court, does not overlap powers reserved to the states. Yet
exercise of fourteenth amendment power may still violate the tenth
amendment if it sweeps more broadly than necessary or unduly pene-
trates the remaining state sovereignty.
If a Restatement Second of the eleventh amendment were at-
tempted in 1979, according to the cases that have cited the amendment
in their holdings, it might read:
Jurisdiction of the Courts of the United States shall not be exercised
in any suit in law commenced or prosecuted by Citizens of any State
against one of the United States in its sovereign capacity without its
consent, nor in any suit in equity upon rights not arising under the
Constitution and laws of the United States; provided, however, that
suits in equity arising under the Constitution and laws of the United
States may be entertained regardless of State consent; and provided
further that nothing herein shall limit the power of Congress to en-
force the Fourteenth Amendment.98
The discussion of the eleventh amendment case law should make clear
that the amendment has become unnecessarily complicated. The major
reason for the complication is the grafting of tenth amendment princi-
ples onto the original eleventh amendment stock.
97. 433 U.S. at 291.
98. The eleventh amendment has inspired a wide range of viewpoints in the law re-
views. In 1975, a student note, after presenting a thorough history culminating with
Edelman, concluded despairingly and rather abruptly that the amendment should be re-
pealed. Note, Constitutional Law-The Eleventh Amendment-Injustice For All, 77 W. VA.
L. REV. 724 (1975). The same year, another commentator concluded that the Edelman inter-
pretation was correct, Congress had the power to subject the states to federal jurisdiction.
Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes ofAction Against State Govern-
ments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413
(1975). After the Court's decision in Fitzpatrick, Judge Weick of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit wrote that in the effort to reconcile state sovereignty with the
supremacy of federal law, the state's immunity had worn dangerously thin. He concluded
that citizens should not look to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but to state law for remedies against the
state, even for constitutional violations. Weick, Erosion of State Sovereign Immunity and the
Eleventh Amendment by Federal Decisional Law, 10 AKRON L. REV. 583 (1977). The most
ambitious attempt to make sense of the amendment was written by a clerk to the Chief
Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, who identified three con-
ceptions of the amendment-the jurisdictional model, sovereign immunity, and individual
rights-that at various times predominated, along with an undercurrent of federalism. The
author concluded that a balancing test should be adopted with preservation of federalism
the goal. Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 139 (1977).
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The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people.99
As it would be misleading to quote the eleventh amendment with-
out discussing the cases traditionally said to have interpreted it, so it is
equally misleading to quote the tenth amendment before discussing the
lack of cases interpreting it. Prior to 1975, tenth amendment case law
had deduced that "[t]he amendment states but a truism that all is re-
tained which has not been surrendered."''00 In 1975, the Court stated
that "[t]he Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that
Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States'
integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system."''°
In Fry P. United States, the Court held that federal control over the
wages of state employees under the Economic Stabilization Act did not
so impair the states' integrity or ability to function as to violate the
tenth amendment. Mr. Justice Rehnquist dissented, relying on Hans v.
Louisiana and recognizing that Hans was not an eleventh amendment
case. In 1976, Mr. Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court in National
League of Cities v. Usery0 2 that the Fair Labor Standards Act as ap-
plied to state employees impaired the states' "separate and independent
existence"' 1 3 and violated the tenth amendment. In 1977, the Court,
relying on Fitzpatrick v. Ritzer, ostensibly an eleventh amendment case,
held in Milliken v. Bradley'04 that a decree ordering Michigan to bear
part of the cost of a remedial reading program in Detroit did not vio-
late the tenth amendment. Fry, League of Cities, and Milliken are the
entire body of recognized tenth amendment law. Throughout the pre-
ceding examination, however, a great many tenth amendment princi-
ples were revealed among ostensibly eleventh amendment cases. The
principle of state sovereignty discussed in Prout v. Starr'0 5 and Exparte
Virginia0 6 was an effort to accommodate the powers yielded with the
powers retained by the states. Mr. Justice Field, dissenting in Exparte
Virginia, acknowledged that the case presented a tenth amendment
99. U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
100. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
101. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975).
102. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
103. Id at 845 (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911); Lane County v.
Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869)).
104. 433 U.S. 267, 291 (1977).
105. 188 U.S. 537 (1903).
106. 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
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issue. 107
State consent to suit is also an effort to accommodate federal and
state powers. The consent doctrine implies that federal courts have
subject matter jurisdiction which cannot be conferred by consent. Con-
sent is more than an element of a cause of action or a prerequisite to
personal jurisdiction. Consent is a conferral of power by the states, or
an accession to power by the United States, the very heart of the tenth
amendment. The distinction between equitable relief and damages,
while useful to determine the real party in interest with respect to both
defendant and plaintiff, also presents a tenth amendment issue con-
cerning the nature of federal intrusion into state affairs even when the
United States is otherwise justified to intrude.
State sovereignty, consent to suit, and the kind of relief sought are
appropriate subjects of inquiry when a state is brought before a federal
court to answer a citizen's complaint. State sovereignty, consent to fed-
eral intrusion, and the kind of intrusion attempted are equally appro-
priate subjects of inquiry when Congress acts to regulate or control.
Treating these matters as tenth amendment issues, however, does
not mean that eleventh amendment case law can serve as precedent for
future tenth amendment results. There is no examination, or even
mention, of the principles of sovereignty, federalism, the nature of fed-
eral power, or the necessity or superfluity of a damage remedy in
Edelman. Even Justice Rehnquist, the author of that opinion, later re-
marked, "Surely there can be no more fundamental constitutional
question than that of the intention of the Framers of the Constitution
as to how authority should be allocated between the National and State
Governments." 0 8
In modern eleventh amendment cases, the Court neglects to ex-
plain why a state is sometimes immune and other times is not. The
common explanation is that the eleventh amendment compels the re-
sult, although unannounced notions of federalism plainly color the re-
sults. Notions of federalism have a place in these cases, but they must
be openly presented and discussed,
Notions of Federalism
Under the eleventh amendment the state is immune from suit only
if three jurisdictional facts are established: 1) the state must be the de-
fendant; 2) a citizen must be the plaintiff; and 3) the state must not have
107. Id. at 353-58 (Field, J., dissenting).
108. Edelman v. Jordan, 421 U.S. 542, 559 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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consented to be sued. Notions of federalism operate to soften or adjust
these jurisdictional facts, but they remain the ultimate facts upon which
the results rest. Even the distinction between equitable relief and dam-
ages began as a means to determine whether the state was the real de-
fendant in interest. Because eleventh amendment cases purport to look
only for certain jurisdictional facts, they exclude a multitude of factors
that should be relevant to tenth amendment problems. For that reason,
eleventh amendment cases cannot simply be recategorized as tenth
amendment cases and serve as meaningful precedent. Nonetheless,
many tenth and eleventh amendment principles can be identified.
Eleventh Amendment Principles
When a private citizen sues a state in its sovereign capacity the
action is barred in federal court. The only exception to this rule is that
a state may consent to suit. Even though consent is a jurisdictional fact
under the eleventh amendment, questions of implied, constructive, or
coerced consent must be determined according to tenth amendment
principles with due regard for the sovereignty of the state and the
proper reach of federal power.'0 9
When any of the three jurisdictional facts is absent the eleventh
amendment does not apply. The eleventh amendment is implicated
only when a private citizen is the real party in interest. Determining
the real party plaintiff includes use of the "clothing doctrine," the pri-
vate attorney general theory under which the United States may be the
real party in interest despite the normal private plaintiff."0
Similarly, a state may or may not be a nominal defendant.
Whether the state is the real party in interest may be determined by
whether a damage award will be satisfied from the state treasury or
whether equitable relief will impinge upon state functions." The
"stripping doctrine" is unsound as a law of the real party in interest
and unprincipled as a law of agency and could be discarded in favor of
a rule based on state sovereign capacity." 2
109. See text accompanying notes 60-61 supra.
110. See text accompanying notes 77-91 supra.
111. See text accompanying notes 62-67 supra.
112. The Supreme Court recently was asked to overrule Exparte Young but declined to
do so in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 156-57 n.6 (1978): "The state defend-
ants challenged the District Court's jurisdiction over them, asserting sovereign immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment. They recognized that in Exparte Young. . ., the Court
held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suit in federal court against a state official
for the purpose of obtaining an injunction against his enforcement of a state law alleged to
be unconstitutional, but urged the District Court to overrule that decision or to restrict its
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When the state is the real party defendant, suit may still be proper
when the state does not act in its sovereign capacity that is, when the
state acts without legitimate power. 1 3 A state violates the United
States Constitution when it exercises power that it has yielded to the
federal government. The sovereign consists of only the things of which
it is constituted. While the sovereign cannot violate the Constitution,
an aggregate of persons, acting in concert and entrusted with the state's
machinery of government, can. That aggregate of persons, even when
labelled the state, does not enjoy the sovereign immunity of the elev-
enth amendment. Defining the sovereignty of the state is a tenth
amendment issue. However, there is a discrepancy between the con-
cept of sovereignty as it has evolved in eleventh amendment cases and
the concept of sovereignty found in Fry v. United States and National
League of Cities v. Usery ("functions essential to separate and in-
dependent existence"). 14 These definitions of sovereignty must be rec-
onciled in future decisions.
Tenth Amendment Principles
Congress may not "wield its power in a fashion that would impair
the States' 'ability to function effectively in a federal system.""' 15 How-
ever, a state may be free to consent to otherwise permissible uses of
federal power. Speaking for the majority in League of Cities, Justice
Rehnquist suggested: "We express no view as to whether different re-
sults might obtain if Congress seeks to affect integral operations of state
governments by exercising authority granted it under other sections of
the Constitution such as the spending power, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, or § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment."'" 16 Use of conditional grants of money
under the spending power may permit Congress to regulate in ways
application. The District Court declined to do so. The request is repeated here, and we
reject it." Note that the Court characterized Young by its result, not by its rationale. As
suggested in the text, the result is proper, only the rationale should be discarded. The inter-
pretation of Young in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. suggests that perhaps the Court has al-
ready discarded the rationale, sub silentio. Certainly the Court no longer subscribes to the
fiction created by Young. "Although the Eleventh Amendment prevented respondents from
suing the State by name, their injunctive suit against prison officials was, for all practical
purposes, brought against the State." Hutto v. Finney 437 U.S. 678, 699 (1978). However,
the Court still demands observance of the formality that the State not be named, and will
dismiss the State if named. Alabama v. Pugh, 98 S. Ct. 3057 (1978).
113. See text accompanying notes 39-52 supra.
114. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976) (quoting Coyle v.
Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911); Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76
(1869)).
115. Id. at 852 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)).
116. Id. at 852 n.17.
[Vol. 30
that would otherwise offend the tenth amendment. The fourteenth
amendment, unlike Congress' enumerated powers in article I, acts ex-
pressly as a check on state action and therefore may warrant greater
intrusion upon state sovereignty. The same principle applies to other
constitutional limitations on state action, such as the expostfacto and
bill of attainder provisions."t 7 The definition of state sovereignty is
based on the function of state government. Sovereignty consists of
those powers reserved to the states by the tenth amendment's terms,
those "not delegated to the United States." Admittedly, the language
of the tenth amendment does not offer much guidance. The court has
discarded the distinction between proprietary and governmental func-
tions as not especially helpful when defining the sovereign realm."18 In
eleventh amendment cases, state sovereignty covered all constitutional
acts of a state; in tenth amendment cases, sovereignty meant "functions
essential to the separate and independent existence" of the state. These
two definitions are not necessarily incompatible. While the definition
of sovereignty under the eleventh amendment may embrace the entire
scope of state activity and be appropriate to determining when suit may
be brought by a private litigant in federal court, the tenth amendment
definition may, consistently, identify the core of the state sovereign
realm where an intrusion can be so disruptive that the Court feels justi-
fied in interposing its judgment for that of Congress. Probably lying
somewhere in between these definitions is the conception of state sover-
eignty the Court uses when reviewing judicial decrees to assure that
they comport with principles of comity, equity, and federalism.
Two factors distinguish these three definitions: whether the Court
itself is balancing the federal-state relationship or is reviewing the bal-
ance struck by a coordinate branch of government; and whether sover-
eignty is conceived as a right of the state or as a limit on the federal
government. The first distinction is a common one in constitutional
law. When the judgment of a coordinate branch of government is in-
volved, the Court defers unless the particular rights at stake are of such
magnitude that careful, individualized scrutiny is required. The second
distinction has found some discussion in tenth amendment cases.
Under the eleventh amendment, sovereignty is treated as a state right.
Under the tenth amendment, sovereignty has been considered a limit
on federal power. Mr. Justice Rehnquist examined this comparison by
117. See text accompanying notes 39-41 supra.
118. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1976). But see Fry v.
United States, 421 U.S. 542, 558 n.2 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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analogy to individual rights in his dissent to Fry v. United States:" ,9
[An individual who attacks an Act of Congress on the ground that it
is not within congressional authority under the Commerce Clause
asserts only a claim of lack of legislative power. . . . [T]his individ-
ual's claim is ordinarily very difficult to sustain. But an individual
who attacks an Act of Congress, justified under the Commerce
Clause, on the ground that it infringes his rights under, say, the First
and Fifth Amendment, is asserting an affirmative constitutional de-
fense of his own, one which can limit the exercise of power which is
otherwise expressly delegated to Congress. 120
In Mr. Justice Rehnquist's opinion, the tenth amendment is a state's
"affirmative constitutional right, inherent in its capacity as a State, to
be free from such congressionally asserted authority."'' 2'
The difference between a limitation and a right could be very
meaningful. If Congress cannot regulate the wages a state pays its
firefighters simply because the commerce power does not justify it, then
Congress could not regulate a private company providing fire protec-
tion services. This interpretation, however, is inconsistent with present
case law under the commerce clause. 22 On the other hand, if Congress
could not. regulate firefighters' wages becase of the states' affirmative
right to be free of interference, it could nevertheless regulate a private
enterprise conducting the same business.
Conceived as a matter of states' rights, the tenth amendment defi-
nition of state sovereignty may be similar to the eleventh amendment
definition, embracing anything a state constitutionally may do. It is a
state's province to provide fire protection. It is Congress' province to
regulate interstate commerce. The wages of firefighters fall within each
province. The state may expect Congress to defer to traditional state
sovereignty if Congress has an alternate means to achieve its purpose.
If Congress can achieve its purpose only by regulating firefighters'
wages, the Court should still determine if the intrusion is warranted.
The Court should examine the importance of the federal objective and
the increment toward that objective that the regulation adds, alongside
the intrusion upon the state activity or interest being invaded. When
the state activity or interest invaded is fundamental to the state's exist-
ence, a compelling justification should be demanded for any invasion.
Even then, the state can demand that any available, less intrusive
means to the federal objective be employed.
119. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
120. Id. at 552-53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 553.
122. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
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Principles of comity, equity, and federalism require that the fed-
eral government intrude no more than is necessary, 23 even when the
federal government is otherwise permitted to intrude under the tenth
amendment. In determining whether the intrusion is properly limited,
the Court is especially reluctant to give effect to statutes or decrees that
dip into the state treasury. 24
The Base of the Iceberg
The most significant effect of redefining eleventh amendment law
as tenth amendment law is the change in the basic analytical approach.
The artificial question of the existence of power may be discarded in
favor of the more realistic question of the balance of power. The prob-
lem becomes a mixed factual and legal issue-whether upon the facts
of the case, Congress or the Court should act, and in what manner,
consistent with the notions of federalism embodied in the Constitution.
To test whether the new definitions of the tenth and eleventh amend-
ments may offer more guidance for future decisionmaking, consider the
facts and holdings of two recent state court cases.
In 1976, the Supreme Court of Ohio, without dissent, held that the
eleventh amendment bars a suit on a federal cause of action by a citi-
zen against a state in a state court. Nelson Souder, a retarded man, had
been involuntarily committed to Orient State Institute at age fifteen,
and for the next thirty-three years worked in the kitchen twelve and
one-half hours a day, two days off per month, for the sum of two dol-
lars a month. In an action to which the state was not a party, Souder
obtained a declaratory judgment in federal court that federal minimum
wage standards applied. Then Souder sought to enforce the decree
against the state in state court. The trial court dismissed the action
because of sovereign immunity and the case reached the Ohio Supreme
Court as Mossman v. Donahey.125 After carefully considering all the
major United States Supreme Court precedent, Justice Stem held:
"[U]nder the line of cases deriving from Hans v. Louisiana. . .it is our
conclusion that state sovereign immunity applies equally to state as
well as federal courts .. . 126 Mossman v. Donahey was decided two
months before NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery, yet reached a similar
result based on eleventh amendment case law. In his concurring opin-
ion in Mossman, Justice William Brown recognized that the case really
123. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691 (1978).
124. See text accompanying notes 69-82 supra.
125. 46 Ohio St. 2d 1, 346 N.E.2d 305 (1976).
126. Id at 18, 346 N.E.2d at 315.
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presented a tenth amendment issue. Joining with the majority, "to pro-
test what constitutes, in my opinion, an incredible federal intrusion into
internal state affairs,"' 27 Justice Brown cited the dissent by Mr. Justice
Rehnquist in Fry and stated:
The situation herein presented is neither a federal program being ad-
ministered by the states nor a state program greatly dependent upon
the federal fisc. Rather, it is a state activity like the administration of
prisons, which historically has been an exclusive state function under
the reserved powers of the Tenth Amendment. 28
The real question in Mossman was the relationship of state and federal
power. Instead of addressing the issue directly, the court erected an
absurd construction of the eleventh amendment. The court, however,
had no tenth amendment principles to guide it and focused upon what
seemed relevant language from the eleventh amendment cases. If the
court had understood the eleventh amendment cases as announcing
principles for adjusting the relationship of state and federal powers, it
should have conducted a more pointed inquiry into the facts of the
case: the severity of the intrusion into the state's sovereign realm and
the importance of the federal purpose involved.
In early 1977, the Supreme Court of Nevada heard State v.
Rosenthal.129 Rosenthal had been denied a state gaming license as a
person who "would reflect or tend to reflect discredit upon the State of
Nevada."'' 30 Rosenthal asserted that because the standards for making
that determination were vague and the decision was arbitrary and ca-
pricious, the gaming commission had violated his due process rights.
Instead of considering the due process contention, the court held that
the due process clause did not apply:
We view gaming as a matter reserved to the states within the mean-
ing of the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution ....
Within this context we find no room for federally protected constitu-
tional rights. This distinctively state problem is to be governed, con-
trolled and regulated by the state legislature and, to the extent the
legislature decrees, by the Nevada Constitution. It is apparent that if
we were to recognize federal protections of this wholly privileged
state enterprise, necessary state control would be substantially dimin-
ished and federal intrusion invited.' 3'
It is one thing to say the due process clause is satisfied with very mini-
mal procedural safeguards or statutory specificity, but it seems incredi-
ble that any court, in 1977, could hold that the due process clause does
127. Id. at 18-19, 346 N.E.2d at 315 (Brown, J., concurring).
128. Id at 19-20, 346 N.E.2d at 316 (Brown, J., concurring).
129. 93 Nev. 36, 559 P.2d 830, appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 803 (1977).
130. Id. at 40, 559 P.2d at 833.
131. Id. at 44-45, 559 P.2d at 836.
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not apply to any state hearing. Regulation of gambling, like the control
of the sale and use of alcohol, has traditionally been a responsibility of
the state. However, despite the mandate of the twenty-first amend-
ment, the United States Supreme Court has held that the fourteenth
amendment still applies to state action in that area. In Craig v.
Boren, l32 the Supreme Court remarked at length on the distinction be-
tween economic regulation under the commerce clause and protection
of individual rights under the due process clause. Thus, even though
control of alcoholic beverages is expressly made a local concern by the
Constitution, the Court noted that "[n]either the text nor the history of
the Twenty-first Amendment suggests that it qualifies individual rights
protected by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment where
the sale or use of liquor is concerned." 133
The Supreme Court of Nevada may have been right that the tenth
amendment prevents the federal government from poaching on the
state's gaming preserve by prescribing what procedures must be em-
ployed. It is quite another matter, however, to say that whatever action
the state chooses to take may encroach upon individual liberty. The
tenth amendment regulates state-citizen relations. While the tenth
amendment may act as a check on the power of the federal government
to enforce the fourteenth amendment, the tenth amendment certainly
does not abrogate the state's self-imposed obligation to safeguard indi-
vidual liberty, undertaken through ratification of the fourteenth
amendment. Recognition of a state sovereign realm untouchable by
the federal government by virtue of the tenth amendment does not
mean the state sovereign realm is not limited by individual rights. The
Nevada Supreme Court simply failed to read the last phrase of the
tenth amendment: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people."134
Conclusion
Recent state court cases indicate that tenth amendment problems
are being confronted by courts which must attempt to define the fed-
eral-state relationship without any identifiable guidance from the
Supreme Court. Supreme Court decisions do offer guidance, but
through historical accident they were labelled with the eleventh amend-
132. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
133. Id at 206 (quoting P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING,
CASES AND MATERIALS 258 (1975)).
134. U.S. CONST. amend. X (emphasis added).
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ment rather than the tenth amendment. It would be an important first
step toward principled decisionmaking in the field of federal-state rela-
tions to recognize that the eleventh amendment has served as a pseudo-
nym for a great many tenth amendment cases.
